We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem which, in contrast to the standard Nash equilibrium problem, allows joint constraints of all players involved in the game. Using a regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function, we then present three optimization problems related to the generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The first optimization problem is a complete reformulation of the generalized Nash game in the sense that the global minima are precisely the solutions of the game. However, this reformulation is nonsmooth. We then modify this approach and obtain a smooth constrained optimization problem whose global minima correspond to so-called normalized Nash equilibria. The third approach uses the difference of two regularized Nikaido-Isoda-functions in order to get a smooth unconstrained optimization problem whose global minima are, once again, precisely the normalized Nash equilibria. Conditions for stationary points to be global minima of the two smooth optimization problems are also given. Some numerical results illustrate the behaviour of our approaches.
Introduction
We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem, GNEP for short. To this end, we first recall the definition of the (standard) Nash equilibrium problem, NEP for short.
Let N be the number of players. Each player ν ∈ {1, . . . , N } controls the variables x ν ∈ R nν . Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) T ∈ R n be the vector formed by all these decision variables, where n := n 1 + . . . + n N . To emphasize the νth player's variables within the vector x, we sometimes write x = (x ν , x −ν ) T , where x −ν subsumes all the other players' variables.
Let θ ν : R n → R be the νth player's payoff (or loss) function. We assume that these payoff functions are at least continuous, and we further assume that the functions θ ν (x) = θ ν (x ν , x −ν ) are convex in the variable x ν . In the standard NEP, the variable x ν belongs to a nonempty, closed and convex set X ν ⊆ R nν , ν = 1, . . . , N . Let
be the Cartesian product of the strategy sets of each player. Then a vector x * ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium, or a solution of the NEP, if the block component x * ,ν satisfies
for all ν = 1, . . . , N . The GNEP generalizes the situation to some extend since now the strategy sets of player ν are allowed to depend on the rival players' strategies, too. More precisely, we assume that X ⊆ R n is a nonempty, closed (not necessarily compact) and convex set which represents the joint constraints of all players ν = 1, . . . , N , so that
becomes the strategy set of player ν, ν = 1, . . . , N . Note that our assumptions on X imply that each set X ν (x −ν ) is also closed and convex. Moreover, if X has the Cartesian product structure as in (1) , then GNEP reduces to a standard NEP. Often, the set X is given by a set of inequalities like X = x ∈ R n g(x) ≤ 0, h ν (x ν ) ≤ 0 ∀ν = 1, . . . , N for some functions g : R n → R m and h ν : R nν → R mν with some numbers m, m ν ≥ 0. Here g represents the joint constraints of all players, whereas h ν depends only on the decision variables of player ν. In this situation, we therefore have
for all ν = 1, . . . , N .
In the context of GNEPs, we also need the set Ω(x) := X 1 (x −1 ) × . . . × X N (x −N ).
equilibrium programming problem. To the best of our knowledge, this observation has not been made elsewhere, at least not under our general assumptions (θ ν convex in x ν and X not necessarily compact). The notation used in this paper is rather standard. Here we only mention that, given a differentiable function Ψ : R n × R n → R, the symbols ∇ x Ψ(x, y) and ∇ y Ψ(x, y) denote the partial derivatives with respect to the x-and y-variables. Finally, we stress that, in our setting, player ν tries to minimize (not maximize) his payoff function θ ν . Hence the name loss function would be better in this context. However, since payoff (or utility) function is the standard name in game theory, we adopt this terminology throughout this paper.
A Nonsmooth Constrained Optimization Reformulation
The aim of this section is to present a (nonsmooth) constrained optimization reformulation of the GNEP from (5) . To this end, we use the notation from the previous section, in particular, the sets X ν (x −ν ) are given by (3) , and Ω(x) denotes the Cartesian product of these sets, cf. (4) . We begin with a very simple, but important observation regarding the set Ω(x).
Proof. Using the definitions of the sets Ω(x) and X ν (x −ν ), we immediately obtain
The second part is now obvious.
Note that, for x ∈ X, we have either Ω(x) = ∅ or Ω(x) = ∅, but then necessarily x ∈ Ω(x). Furthermore, given any x ∈ X, simple examples show that, in general, neither Ω(x) is a subset of X nor X is included in Ω(x). The main tool in order to obtain our optimization reformulations of the GNEP is the Nikaido-Isoda-function
cf. [27] . Sometimes also the name Ky-Fan-function can be found in the literature, see [12, 13] . Using this Nikaido-Isoda-function, we define
where, for the moment, we assume implicitly that the supremum is always attained for some y ∈ Ω(x). Later, this assumption will not be needed, so we do not state it here explicitly. Then it is not difficult to see that V (x) is nonnegative for all x ∈ Ω(x), and that x * is a solution of the GNEP if and only if x * ∈ Ω(x * ) and V (x * ) = 0, see also the proof of Theorem 2.2 below. Therefore, finding a solution of the GNEP is equivalent to computing a global minimum of the optimization problem
Note that this optimization problem has a complicated feasible set since Ω(x) explicitly depends on x. However, in view of Lemma 2.1, the program (8) is equivalent to the optimization problem
Although the Nikaido-Isoda-function is quite popular (especially for standard Nash games) in the economic and engineering literature, see, for example, [1, 2, 6, 23, 24] , it has some disadvantages from a mathematical and practical point of view (also for the standard Nash game): On the one hand, given a vector x, the supremum in (6) may not exist unless additional assumptions (like the compactness of X) hold, and on the other hand, this supremum, if it exists, is usually not attained at a single point which, in turn, implies that the mapping V and, therefore, also the corresponding optimization reformulation (8) is nondifferentiable in general. In order to overcome these deficiencies, we use a simple regularization of the Nikaido-Isoda-function. This idea was used earlier in several contexts, see, for example, Fukushima [15] (for variational inequalities), Gürkan and Pang [17] (for standard Nash games), and Mastroeni [26] (for equilibrium programming problems). Here we apply the regularization idea to GNEPs. To this end, let α > 0 be a fixed parameter and define the regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function by
Furthermore, for x ∈ X, let
be the corresponding value function. A number of elementary properties of the mapping V α are summarized in the following result.
Theorem 2.2
The regularized function V α has the following properties:
(b) x * is a generalized Nash equilibrium if and only if x * ∈ Ω(x * ) and V α (x * ) = 0.
(c) For every x ∈ X, there exists a unique vector y α (x) = y 1 α (x), . . . , y N α (x) such that for every ν = 1, . . . , N ,
(b) Suppose that x * is a solution of the GNEP. Then x * ∈ Ω(x * ) and
Together with part (a), we therefore have V α (x * ) = 0. Conversely, assume that x * ∈ Ω(x * ) and V α (x * ) = 0. Then Ψ α (x * , y) ≤ 0 holds for all y ∈ Ω(x * ). Let us fix a particular player ν ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and let x ν ∈ X ν (x * ,ν ) and λ ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. Then define a vector y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ) ∈ R n blockwise as follows:
The convexity of the sets X ν (x * ,−ν ) imply that y µ ∈ X µ (x * ,−µ ) for all µ = 1, . . . , N , i.e., y ∈ Ω(x * ). For this particular y, we therefore obtain
from the convexity of θ ν with respect to x ν . Dividing both sides by 1 − λ and then letting λ → 1 − shows that θ ν (x * ,ν , x * ,−ν ) ≤ θ ν (x ν , x * ,−ν ). Since this holds for all x ν ∈ X ν (x * ,−ν ) and all ν = 1, . . . , N , it follows that x * is a solution of the GNEP.
(c) This statement follows immediately from the fact that the mapping y ν → θ ν (y ν , x −ν ) + α 2 x ν − y ν 2 is strongly convex (for any given x), also taking into account that X ν (x −ν ) is a nonempty, closed and convex set, cf. Lemma 2.1.
Note that the previous result reduces to Proposition 3 in [17] for the standard Nash equilibrium problem. Using the first two statements of Theorem 2.2, we see that finding a solution of the GNEP is equivalent to computing a global minimum of the constrained optimization problem
which, in turn, can be reformulated as
in view of Lemma 2.1. The last statement of Theorem 2.2 shows that the new objective function overcomes one of the deficiencies of the mapping V (x).
The following result shows that the definition of the mapping V α can also be used in order to get a fixed point characterization of the GNEP. Proof. First assume that x * is a solution of GNEP. Then we obtain x * ∈ Ω(x * ) (and, therefore, x * ∈ X in view of Lemma 2.1) and V α (x * ) = 0 from Theorem 2.2. In view of the definition of y α (x * ), this implies
On the other hand, we also have Ψ α (x * , x * ) = 0. Since x * ∈ Ω(x * ) and the maximum y α (x * ) is uniquely defined by Theorem 2.2, it follows that x * = y α (x * ).
Conversely, let x * be a fixed point of the mapping y α . Then x * = y α (x * ) ∈ Ω(x * ) and
Consequently, the statement follows from Theorem 2.2.
We next consider a simple example which shows that, in general, the objective function from (11) is nondifferentiable.
Example 2.4 Consider the GNEP with N = 2 players and the following optimization problems:
0}. An elementary calculation shows that the solution set is given by
.
We want to compute V α (x). To this end, we first note that the regularized Nikaido-Isodafunction for this game is
Moreover, for this example, we have
Given x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R 2 , the solution of the first minimization problem is given by
, and the solution of the second problem is
However, since we are only interested in x ∈ X, the above formula simplify to
respectively. Now it is easy to see that the corresponding mapping
is not everywhere differentiable on the feasible set X.
The nondifferentiability of the mapping V α is a major disadvantage if one wants to apply suitable optimization methods to the corresponding reformulation (11) . In the following section, we therefore describe a modification of our current approach which results into a smooth optimization reformulation of the GNEP. We stress, however, that the situation is much more favourable if we specialize our results to the standard NEP. Then it can be shown that the mapping V α is continuously differentiable provided all payoff functions θ ν are smooth. This follows from the observation given in Remark 3.10 below.
A Smooth Constrained Optimization Reformulation
In this section, we modify the idea of the previous one and obtain another constrained optimization reformulation of the GNEP which has significantly different properties than the reformulation discussed in Section 2. In particular, the reformulation to be given here is smooth. However, it does not give a complete reformulation of all solutions of the GNEP, but it provides a characterization of the so-called normalized Nash equilibria.
Definition 3.1 A vector x * ∈ X is called a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP, if sup y∈X Ψ(x * , y) ≤ 0 holds, where Ψ denotes the Nikaido-Isoda-function from (6).
The above definition of a normalized Nash equilibrium corresponds to one given in, e.g., [13, 36] . Note that it is slightly different from the original definition of a normalized equilibrium given in [35] , see, however, the corresponding results in [13, 10] . It is not difficult to see that a normalized Nash equilibrium is always a solution of the GNEP, whereas the converse is not true in general. We next state a simple property of the Nikaido-Isoda-function which follows immediately from the fact that the payoff functions θ ν (x) = θ ν (x ν , x −ν ) are convex with respect to x ν . Lemma 3.2 For any given x ∈ X, the Nikaido-Isoda-function Ψ(x, y) is concave in y ∈ X.
In order to derive a smooth reformulation of the GNEP, our basic tool is, once again, the regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function Ψ α (x, y) from (9) . Based on this mapping, we definê
Note that, due to Lemma 3.2, given an arbitrary x ∈ X, we take the maximum of a uniformly concave function in y, henceV α (x) is well-defined. Comparing the definition of V α with the one of V α in (10), we see that the only difference is that the maximum is taken over all y ∈ X instead of all y ∈ Ω(x). This minor change has a number of important consequences. We first state the counterpart of Theorem 2.2 for the mappingV α .
The regularized functionV α has the following properties:
First let x * be a normalized Nash equilibrium. Then x * ∈ X and sup y∈X Ψ(x * , y) ≤ 0. Hence Ψ(x * , y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ X. Since
Assume there is a vectorŷ ∈ X such that Ψ(x * ,ŷ) > 0. Then λx * + (1 − λ)ŷ ∈ X for all λ ∈ (0, 1), and Lemma 3.2 implies
Therefore, we obtain
for all λ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to 1. This, however, is a contradiction to (13) .
(c) In view of Lemma 3.2, the mapping y → Ψ(x, y) − α 2 x − y 2 is strongly concave (uniformly in x). Hence statement (c) is a consequence of standard sensitivity results, see, for example, [20, Corollaries 8.1 and 9.1]. Theorem 3.3 shows that we can characterize the normalized Nash equilibria of a GNEP as the global minima of the constrained optimization problem
In contrast to the corresponding reformulation in (11), we do not get a reformulation of all generalized Nash equilibria. We next state the counterpart of Proposition 2.3. Its proof is omitted here since it is essentially the same as the one for Proposition 2.3 (using Theorem 3.3 instead of Theorem 2.2). Our next aim is to show that the regularized functionV α is continuously differentiable, provided that the payoff functions θ ν are continuously differentiable for each player ν = 1, . . . , N . The continuous differentiability of the functions θ ν will therefore be assumed implicitly throughout the rest of this section.
Theorem 3.5 The regularized functionV α is continuously differentiable for every x ∈ X, and its gradient is given by
whereŷ α (x) denotes the unique maximizer from Theorem 3.3 (c) associated to the given vector x.
Proof. We first recall that the regularized functionV α can be represented as in the last line of (12) , and that the mapping
is strongly concave for any fixed x in view of Lemma 3.2. Hence it follows from Danskin's Theorem (see, for example, [9] ) thatV α is differentiable with gradient ∇V α (x) = ∇ x Ψ α (x, y) y=ŷα(x) . Using the definition of the mapping Ψ α , an elementary calculation shows that
Inserting y =ŷ α (x) then gives the desired formula for the gradient ofV α . Since all payoff functions θ ν are continuously differentiable, and sinceŷ α (x) is also a continuous mapping of x in view of Theorem 3.3, we finally get that the gradient
is continuous, i.e., the regularized functionV α is continuously differentiable.
So far, we know that (14) gives a reformulation of the GNEP as a smooth constrained optimization problem. In order to get a solution of the GNEP, however, we need to compute a global minimum of (14) . Since most algorithms only find stationary points, the question arises under which conditions such a stationary point is already a global minimum. Such a condition is introduced in the following assumption.
We postpone a discussion of this assumption until the end of this section. The following result first shows that Assumption 3.6 provides a sufficient condition for a stationary point to be a global minimum and, therefore, a normalized Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.7 Let x * ∈ X be a stationary point of (14) in the sense that
If Assumption 3.6 holds at x = x * , then x * is a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP.
Proof. Using (15) and the representation of the gradient ∇V α (x * ) from Theorem 3.5, we obtain
for all x ∈ X. Choosing x =ŷ α (x * ), we therefore get
Now recall thatŷ α (x * ) is the unique solution of the optimization problem
Consequently,ŷ α (x * ) satisfies the corresponding optimality conditions
Using z = x * , we therefore obtain
Taking this into account, we get
from (16) . Now assume that x * =ŷ α (x * ). Then (21) and Assumption 3.6 together imply 0 < 0. This contradiction shows that x * =ŷ α (x * ). Hence x * is a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP because of Proposition 3.4.
Assumption 3.6 may be viewed as a kind of strict monotonicity or positive definiteness assumption. To illustrate this point, consider the case where all payoff functions θ ν are quadratic, say
for certain matrices A νµ ∈ R nν ×nµ with A νν symmetric (without loss of generality). Additional linear terms are also allowed, but they do not change the subsequent discussion. Now let A ∈ R n×n be the matrix with (ν, µ)-block component A νµ , so that A = (A νµ ) N ν,µ=1 . Then the following result holds. Proposition 3.8 Assume that the payoff functions θ ν are given by (18) for ν = 1, . . . , N , and suppose that the matrix A = (A νµ ) N ν,µ=1 is positive definite. Then Assumption 3.6 is satisfied at an arbitrary point x ∈ R n .
Proof. Let x ∈ R n be arbitrarily given. Then
Consequently, by an elementary calculation, we obtain
> 0 whenever x =ŷ α (x). Hence Assumption 3.6 holds.
The following note shows that no regularization of the Nikaido-Isoda-function is necessary if the payoff functions θ ν have some stronger properties than those mentioned so far. This means that there is no need to regularize the function Ψ for strongly convex payoff functions. The proof of the above statement follows by simple inspection of the proofs given in this section. Also a stationary point result can be derived similar to Theorem 3.7. Note, however, that the unconstrained optimization reformulation to be presented in Section 4 needs a regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function even in the case of strongly convex functions θ ν .
We close this section with a simple note on the application of our results to the standard NEP.
Remark 3.10 Suppose that the nonempty, closed, and convex set X ⊆ R n has the Cartesian product structure from (1) . Then Ω(x) = X for all x, and the GNEP reduces to the standard NEP. Moreover, it follows that
for all x ∈ X, i.e., the two functions V α from the previous section andV α from the current section coincide. In particular, the mapping V α is therefore also continuously differentiable when applied to a standard NEP.
An Unconstrained Optimization Reformulation
We use the regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function in order to obtain an unconstrained optimization reformulation of the GNEP in this section. To this end, let 0 < α < β be two given parameters, let
be the associated regularized Nikaido-Isoda functions, and let
be the corresponding regularized value functions. Formally, these functions are defined only for x ∈ X in the previous section. However, it is easy to see that they can be defined for any x ∈ R n . Similar to the way the D-gap function was derived from the regularized gap function in the context of variational inequalities, see [32, 37] , we then definê
In order to show that this difference of two regularized Nikaido-Isoda-functions gives an unconstrained optimization reformulation of the GNEP, we first state the following result.
holds for all x ∈ R n .
Proof. By definition, we have for any
and, thereforeV
This impliesV
for all x ∈ R n . This proves the right-hand inequality in (19) . The other inequality can be verified in a similar way.
Note that, similar to an observation in [21] , Lemma 4.1 immediately implies that the level sets of the functionV αβ are compact for compact sets X. This observation guarantees that any sequence {x k } generated by a descent method forV αβ will remain bounded and, therefore, has at least one accumulation point. As another consequence of Lemma 4.1, we obtain the following result. Proof. (a) Using Proposition 3.4, we havê
for all x ∈ R n .
(b) First assume that x * is a normalized Nash equilibrium. Then Proposition 3.4 implies x * =ŷ α (x * ) and x * =ŷ β (x * ). Hence (19) immediately givesV αβ (x * ) = 0. Conversely, let x * be such thatV αβ (x * ) = 0. Then (19) implies x * =ŷ β (x * ). Hence x * solves the GNEP in view of Proposition 3.4. Theorem 4.2 shows that the normalized Nash equilibria of GNEP are precisely the global minima of the unconstrained optimization problem
We next note that this is a smooth problem. To this end, however, we need to assume, for the remainder of this section, that all payoff functions θ ν are continuously differentiable. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 4.3
The functionV αβ is continuously differentiable for every x ∈ R n , and its gradient is given by
Proof. First recall thatV α (x) andV β (x) are defined for all x ∈ R n . Then observe that the formula for the gradients of these two functions, as given in Theorem 3.5 for x ∈ X, remain true for all x ∈ R n . Since we have ∇V αβ (x) = ∇V α (x) − ∇V β (x), the statement follows from Theorem 3.5.
We now know that (20) is a smooth unconstrained reformulation of the GNEP. However, we need to compute the global minimum ofV αβ . Since standard optimization software is usually only able to find a stationary point, we next want to give a result saying that such a stationary point is already a normalized Nash equilibrium under certain conditions. To this end, we first state the following preliminary result. 
holds for any x ∈ R n .
Proof. As noted in the proof of Theorem 3.7,ŷ ν α (x) satisfies the optimality condition
In a similar way, it follows thatŷ ν β (x) satisfies
Using z =ŷ β (x) in the first inequality and z =ŷ α (x) in the second inequality, we get
respectively. Adding these two inequalities gives the desired result.
In order to state a result that a stationary point is, automatically, a global minimum of V αβ , we need a certain condition which is quite similar to the one stated in Assumption 3.6. 
It is easy to see from the proof of Proposition 3.8 that, under the assumption of that result, we also have a sufficient condition for Assumption 4.5 to hold. Using Assumption 4.5, we are now able to state the following result. Proof. Since x * is a stationary point ofV αβ , we obtain from Theorem 4.3
Multiplication with ŷ β (x * ) −ŷ α (x * ) T and using Lemma 4.4, we therefore get
Assume thatŷ β (x * ) −ŷ α (x * ) = 0. Then the previous chain of inequalities together with Assumption 4.5 gives the contradiction 0 > 0. Henceŷ α (x * ) =ŷ β (x * ). But then (21) simplifies to (β − α)(x * −ŷ α (x * )) = 0. Since α < β, this implies x * =ŷ α (x * ). Consequently, x * is a normalized Nash equilibrium in view of Proposition 3.4.
Numerical Illustrations
Here we want to illustrate the performance of our unconstrained optimization reformulation on some GNEPs taken from the literature. To this end, we use the Barzilai-Borwein (BB) gradient method [4] (see also [33, 34, 14, 7, 16] for some subsequent modifications and investigations of this first-order method) for the unconstrained minimization of the objective functionV αβ . This method uses the iterative procedure
with the stepsize
Hence the BB method has the advantage of using an explicit formula for the stepsize, so no extra line search is required which would be very expensive in our case since this would require further evaluations of the mappingV αβ . Each function evaluation ofV αβ , however, needs the solution of two constrained optimization problems in order to computeŷ α (x) andŷ β (x). We therefore believe that the BB method fits perfectly into our setting. The implementation is done in MATLAB using the function fmincon from the Optimization Toolbox to compute the valuesŷ α (x) andŷ β (x). We use the parameters α = 0.02 and β = 0.05 for all test examples, and terminate the iteration ifV αβ (x k ) ≤ ε with ε := 10 −8 .
Example 5.1 This test problem is taken from [10, Example 3.8] . There are two players, each player has one decision variable. The example has infinitely many Nash equilibria, but only one normalized Nash equilibrium at x * := 3 4 , 1   4 T . The iteration history of our method applied to this example with the starting point x 0 := (0, 0) T is given in Table 1 .
∇V αβ (x k ) 0 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.0093111567 0.0235577850 1 0.00010481 0.00003654 0.0093085421 0.0235544767 2 0.74630253 0.26018955 0.0000017132 0.0003161316 3 0.74978601 0.25017191 0.0000000011 0.0000079447 Example 5.2 This is the duopoly example from [24] , so there are two players. Each player controls one variable. The solution is x * := 16 3 , 16   3 T . The iteration history of our method, using the starting point x 0 := (2, 0) T from [24] , is summarized in Table 2 .
∇V αβ (x k ) 0 2.00000000 0.00000000 1.2315865733 0.1366926294 1 2.00198061 0.00316894 1.2301234437 0.1366113010 2 5.32890551 5.32619359 0.0000021945 0.0001825423 3 5.33333413 5.33333003 0.0000000000 0.0000000907 [24] . This time there are three players, and once again each player controls only one variable. Table 3 contains the iteration history for our unconstrained minimization approach using the starting point x 0 := (0, 0, 0) T from [24] . Example 5.4 This is the electricity market example from [19] , also used in [6] . There are three players (companies) and altogether six variables, the first player controls one variable (corresponding to one electricity plant), the second player controls two variables (he owns two electricity plants), and the third player controls the remaining three variables (electricity plants). Starting at x 0 := (0, . . . , 0) T , we get the iteration history given in Table  4 (where only the first three components of the iteration vector x k are shown). The method terminates at the approximate solution Note that the final value ofV αβ (x k ) is slightly negative. This is due to the fact that the computation of the valuesŷ α (x k ) andŷ β (x k ) are (necessarily) done inexactly.
Example 5.5 Here we consider the internet switching model from [22] in a slightly modified version that was also analysed in [11] . More precisely, we use the constraints x ν ≥ l ν for all players with the lower bounds l ν := 0.01 for all ν = 1, . . . , N and the additional capacity constraint N ν=1 x ν ≤ B for some positive constant B. Note that we use positive lower bounds here since otherwise the payoff functions of the players used in [22, 11] are
∇V αβ (x k ) 0 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.0000000000 212. 9967936440 not defined everywhere on the feasible set. We take N = 10 and B = 1 for our computations, together with the starting point x 0 = (0.1, . . . , 0.1) T which is close to the solution at x * = (0.09, . . . , 0.09) T . We therefore expect that our method converges after just a few steps, and this is indeed the case, see Table 5 .
∇V αβ (x k ) 0 0.10000000 0.10000000 0.0003822155 0.0247426159 1 0.09996128 0.09996128 0.0003791924 0.0246404400 2 0.09062399 0.09062399 0.0000014200 0.0014458597 3 0.09004195 0.09004193 0.0000000081 0.0000220902 Table 5 : Numerical results for Example 5.5
We next give a short comparison of our method with the relaxation method from [36] . This relaxation method computes a sequence {x k } according to the formula x k+1 := (1 − α k )x k + α k y(x k ), k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where α k ∈ (0, 1] is a suitable parameter and y(x k ) is the same as y α (x k ) from Theorem 3.3 with α = 0, i.e., we obtain y(x k ) by maximizing the Nikaido-Isoda function without regularization. Theoretically, the relaxation method is well-defined only under some stronger assumptions that are not necessary for our approaches. However, if these conditions are met and the parameter α k satisfies
the method converges to a normalized Nash equilibrium, see [36] for details. The two requirements (22) suggest to take α k := 1 k+1 or a related updating. Since numerical results indicate that the relaxation method converges much better if α k is taken to be a fixed number during the first few iterations, we use an idea similar to [2] and choose α k := 0.5, if k ≤ 40, 0.5 1 k−40 , if k > 40. This choice guarantees that, theoretically, (22) holds, whereas in practice this means that we take the constant value α k = 0.5 for all four examples.
We terminate the relaxation method as soon asV (x k ) ≤ ε with ε := 10 −8 , wherê V (x) :=V α (x) is the function from (12) with α = 0. Hence the termination criterion for the relaxation method is similar to the one used before in our method, although they are not directly comparable. Table 6 compares the number of iterations required by the relaxation method applied to Examples 5.1-5.4 with our unconstrained minimization approach.
Method
Ex. 5.1 Ex. 5.2 Ex. 5.3 Ex. 5.4 Ex. 5. 5  Relaxation method  20  26  34  40  50  Our method  3  3  18  13  3   Table 6 : Number of iterations of relaxation method and our method To put the results from Table 6 in the right perspective, one should take into account that the main computational burden of the relaxation method is the solution of one constrained optimization problem, whereas our method has to solve two constrained optimization problems at each iteration. The remaining overhead of both methods is neglectable. However, even if we multiply the iteration numbers of our method with the factor two, we are usually still better (usually much better) than the relaxation method. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the relaxation method takes relatively many iterations for Example 5.5 where the starting point was chosen close to the solution.
Final Remarks
We presented some optimization reformulations of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem such that the global minima of these reformulations correspond to (normalized) Nash equilibria of the underlying game. Two of these optimization reformulations were smooth with a continuously differentiable objective function, and their stationary points were shown to be global minima under suitable assumptions.
One of our future projects is to establish conditions under which the smooth objective functions have a (strongly) semismooth gradient in the sense of [30, 31, 29] . The advantage of such a result would be that it would allow the application of nonsmooth Newton methods to the corresponding optimization reformulation which then should be locally superlinearly or quadratically convergent under certain assumptions.
